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Financing the Burra Burra Mines, South Australia: Liquidity 
Problems and Resolutions * 
 
By MEL DAVIES 
University of Western Australia 
 
 
Although acclaimed as the richest copper mine in the world during the late 1840s and 
1850s,  the  early  years  of  activity  at  the  South  Australian  Mining  Association’s 
[hereafter  SAMA]  Burra  Burra  Mine  were  fraught  with  problems,  especially  those 
associated with maintaining liquidity. This, despite copper content in the ore averaging 
between 22 and 23 per cent over the first 25 years of activity from 1845 to 1869, and 
with some commentators suggesting that the working of the mine was more akin to 
quarrying than conventional mining.
i While the outcome saw prodigious dividends that 
averaged 300 per cent per annum over the first 21 years of activity, problems associated 
with distance from markets in Britain and India proved especially problematic during 
the early years of mining activity. While the liquidity problems were largely overcome 
after 1850, nevertheless strategies continued to be adopted so as to reduce costs in order 
to maintain liquidity and to ensure efficiency in the marketing of ores and copper. The 
story which emerges is that even the owners of the richest mine in Australia, and indeed 
for a period of time the richest copper mine in the world, had great problems in both 
maintaining liquidity and in seeing that they served their main goal of looking after the 
interests  of  shareholders.  Various  strategies  were  adopted  by  SAMA  to  overcome 
problems associated with marketing of produce and the controlling of costs, especially 
in light of it being the largest employer of labour in Australia in the 1840s. This proved 
a challenge to the directors and says much for their achievement in overcoming the 
financial problems in such a large enterprise. As part of their strategy, the Association 
helped  to  maximise  its  returns  through  adoption  of  strategies  that  exploited  labour 
through adoption of wage systems and selling of materials to miners that guaranteed 
advantage to the employers.  
 
Early problems and dilemmas 
The Colony of South Australia was barely eight years old when a shepherd discovered 
the Burra Burra deposits in 1845. This coincided with another promising discovery at a 
site to be known as the Princess Royal.
ii In fact, the two deposits were so close that the 
colonial government in its wisdom decided that the deposits would be contained within  
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the boundaries of a 20,000-acre lot, as determined under the Wastelands Act of 1842 
and that the land should be sold as one block at £1 per acre. The Governor of South 
Australia further decreed that the required £20,000 could not be paid in bills but would 
have to be paid in cash within a stipulated period.
iii Unfortunately, being in the midst of 
an economic crisis that had virtually placed the colony into bankruptcy, there was very 
little cash available, as illustrated by the fact that at that time, the two banks in the 
colony  held  between  them  only  £2,600  in  specie.
iv  With  a  race  to  try  to  raise  the 
required funds, three contenders emerged, the so-called ’Nobs’ who were comprised of 
a few of the wealthier merchants and landowners; the shareholders of SAMA, and the 
members  of  the  ‘Committee  of  the  Mining  Association  for  the  Northern  Monster 
Lode’.
v Collectively known as the ‘Snobs’ the representatives of the latter two groups 
were mostly petty merchants, shopkeepers and others of limited means considered to 
have pretensions towards social and economic elevation.
vi Not one contestant for the 
two deposits had sufficient funds to meet the requirements and in the end they were 
forced to combine financial resources to pay the £20,000 into the government’s coffers. 
Following  resistance  by  the  ‘Nobs’  to  a  merger,  it  was  decided  to  allocate  the  two 
individual  deposits  by  the  drawing  of  straws,  by  which  time  the  members  of  the 
Northern Monster Lode, by far the wealthier of the two groups with holdings of £10,105 
as against the £2,215 held by SAMA subscribers,
vii had agreed to combine with and join 
SAMA in their attempt to raise half the required land purchase cost.
viii In the subsequent 
‘draw’ for the copper deposits it was SAMA who won the right to the ‘Monster Lode’ 
as it became known, while the ‘Snobs’ won the right to exploit the Princess Royal. 
Unfortunately for the latter, and illustrating the adage that mining is often a lottery, their 
copper  deposit  was  little  more  than  surface  deep  and  the  company  never  paid  a 
dividend,
ix whereas the SAMA combine went on to mine extraordinary wealth from the 
deposit known as the Burra Burra Mines.  
  Despite  this  good  fortune,  SAMA  was  faced  with  a  dilemma.  Its  total 
subscribed capital amounted to only £12,320, meaning that after payment of the moiety 
of  the  land  purchase  to  the  government  there  was  only  £2,320  in  its  coffers.  To 
compound difficulties the mine was about 100 miles [160km] inland from Adelaide. 
There was no infrastructure, not even a dirt track from Port to mine, and certainly no 
housing or other amenities that of necessity had to be provided by the Association. Not 
only was it vital for SAMA to expend on such vital infrastructure but its workers had to 
be paid wages and money found for stores. Funding inland carriage and cost of shipping  
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the ores to overseas markets added to their woes. While early exploitation from the 
mine proved prodigious, the problem lay in converting that produce into tangible funds 
so as to sustain activity and meet all costs. 
  With the outlet for the ores in 1845 being on the other side of the world in 
Swansea, Wales, and with returns on sales being realized in Adelaide even under the 
best scenario some ten months or a year later,
x the early years of activity posed great 
problems, especially noting the aforementioned depression that had hit South Australia. 
While there were two banks that could have offered credit, there was great reluctance to 
do so. Edward Stephens at the Bank of South Australia refused to extend credit on the 
grounds that mining was too risky a proposition, while the London Directors of the 
Bank  of  Australasia  had  given  written  instructions  to  their  local  manager,  Marshall 
MacDermott, that under no circumstances was he to do so.
xi Besides, there were legal 
restrictions on the banks from making advances on deeds of land and property until the 
late 1850s,
xii a situation that caused discontent among both miners and agriculturalists in 
the colony.
 xiii  
  Yet another problem faced by SAMA was its organizational formation under 
the  ‘Cost-book’  system.  By  Charter  and  Prospectus  such  ‘No-liability’  companies 
(taken  directly  from  the  Cornish  method  of  organization)  forbade  the  acceptance  of 
credit  except  under  security  of  property.
xiv  However,  as  already  noted,  banking 
legislation  was  such  that  until  the  late  1850s  collateral  of  land  title  deeds  was 
unacceptable, thus making it difficult for this avenue to be pursued for raising of funds, 
and the banks found handling property in the form of minerals to pose elements of risk 
they  were  reluctant  to  adopt.  Banks  in  the  early  years  of  mining  production  were 
apparently more interested in servicing agricultural activity by accepting wool than they 
were in accepting ores. Other strategies had to be adopted until they could be persuaded 




Sales of ore to local customers or merchants would obviously have answered SAMA’s 
dilemma.  Not  only  was  this  administratively  simple  but  it  also  cut  the  risks  of 
speculating  on  foreign  markets.  However,  before  resorting  to  selling  locally,  the 
directors were keen to test the market so as to establish pricing benchmarks and to build 
up a reputation for what they considered to be their superior ores.
xv This delayed such a 
strategy from being adopted. Unfortunately for the Association, even after proving the  
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ore  values  overseas,  it  found  only  limited  interest,  for  local  merchants  had  no 
experience in exporting ores and were extremely cautious because of limited market 
knowledge.  Resistance  was  also  associated  with  suspicion  about  the  accuracy  of 
SAMA’s assaying.
xvi To overcome this latter problem and to induce interest among the 
merchants, SAMAs directors came to an accommodation when they agreed in 1848 that 
although ‘Parties … from experience, [were now] able to give a fairly good guess as to 
the probable metallic contents of a heap of ore ...’, SAMA would repay at market price 
any assay difference between Adelaide and Swansea percentages. The merchants were 
in turn obliged to repay SAMA for ores that were underestimated at Adelaide.
xvii Only 
some two years after the opening of the mine on 29 September 1845 did a home sale of 
significance take place, when the firm of C. & F.J. Beck purchase 280 tons of ore at 
£13.10s per ton in August 1847.
xviii This was, however, an isolated case and only a year 
later  in  the  first  half  of  1848  did  other  local  merchants  play  a  significant  part  in 
purchasing  the  Association’s  produce.  Even  then  caution  remained  their  policy, 
purchases being restricted largely to periods when price stability or an upward trend 
continued to be recorded for a substantial period of time, or when copper or ore proved 
attractive when used as ballast in conjunction with a merchant’s wool exports. In times 
of uncertainty associated with wide price fluctuations speculation was avoided by local 
merchants, forcing SAMA to resort to its own direct marketing abroad [tables 1 & 2]. 
 
Table 1: Sales of Copper ores by SAMA 1845-1854 (£) 
 
Period  Drafts  sold 
to 
shareholders 
on  London 
Agents £ 
Drafts sold by 
SAMA to Bank 























1845-46  Nil    10,024  Nil       204  Nil    10,228 
1846-47  Nil    43,110  Nil         10  Nil    43,120 
1847-48  Nil    63,001  Nil  49,837  Nil  112,838 
1848-49  Nil  135,161  2,276  16,379   1,012 *  154,828 
1849-50  2,000    80,330  6,950  1,012  21,172  165,372 
1850-51  7,500    73,560  Nil  44,084  62,789  187,933 
1851-52  7,469    74,890  Nil  12,451  57,504  152,314 
1852-53  38,606    64,800  Nil  12,451  57,504  152,314 
1853-54  16,103  Nil  Nil  44,468   1,074    61,645 
Sources:  Minutes  of  Directors  Meetings,  SAMA,  BRG  22,  957,  South  Australian  Archives;  [SAA]; 
Directors Out-letter Books, BRG 22, 960, SAA; Records of the Patent Copper Company, and the English 
& Australia Copper Company, Cash book 7 and Ledgers No. 1, No. 2, No. 3, BRG 30, SAA. 
*Returns were mainly in copper ingots and only occasionally was SAMA paid in cash by the smelters. 
 
  Periodic shipping shortages also proved problematic, a situation exacerbated by 
the British Navigation Acts that until 1850 prevented cargoes being taken by foreign  
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ships from the colonies. This frustrating situation was illustrated in 1848 when after 
waiting months for sails to appear over the horizon, delight was turned to frustration 
when realized that the ships that did appear were German immigrant carrying vessels 
that were forced to leave Port Adelaide in ballast. Exacerbating the shipping problem in 
the early period of mining activity was also the reluctance by some ship-owners to carry 
copper  ore,  this  because  of  lack  of  stowage  knowledge  and  also  from  fear  of 
spontaneous  combustion  associated  with  sulphide  ores,  though  that  problem  was 




Table 2: Dispersion of SAMA Copper and Copper Ores 1841-1880 
 
Period  Copper  sales* 
(tons) 
Sales  to  local 
merchants (%) 
Sales  to  local 
smelters (%) 
SAMA  Consignments 























Sources: Minutes of Directors Meetings, SAMA, BRG 957, South Australian Archives [SAA]; Minutes of 
Meetings of Shareholders, BRG 22, 959, SAA; Directors Out-letter Books, BRG 22, 960, SAA; Records 
of the Patent Copper Company, and the English & Australia Copper Company, BRG 30, SAA. 
*Note: Expressed in terms of copper units. Tonnages include copper ore and copper sales with tonnages 
of ore being expressed according to the content of copper in the assay. 
 
  It is pertinent that most of the early local purchasers were merchants who were 
also  members  of  SAMA’s  board  of  directors.  For  example  C  &  F.J.  Beck  who 
purchased ores worth £21,780, and Montefiore & Co. who expended £2,375. C & F.J 
Beck at the time acted as South Australian agents for the Liverpool house of Duncan 
Dunbar and their purchases were probably made on behalf of that firm on a commission 
basis.
xx  Speculators  appeared  to  be  few  and  far  between,  and  the  inclusion  of  the 
Australian Mining Co., an English based concern interested in copper, proved to be a 
forced  purchase,  it  ‘not  having  an  ounce  to  ship’  from  its  own  mine  and  having 
chartered several vessels in anticipation of full cargoes’.
xxi 
  Inter-colonial merchants, especially those based in Victoria, proved to be an 
important source of revenue over the life of the mine, with about half of their purchases 
being made in cash and a half in bills of exchange (usually drawn on Melbourne at 15 
days after sight, though drafts at 3 days were not uncommon). However, few such sales 
were made before the 1850s [Fig. 1], although it is possible that local agents bought on 
behalf of inter-colonial merchants. For example, it is known that the largest purchaser of  
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SAMA’s copper between 1855-56 and 1859-60 was the firm of Henriques & Co. who 
acted on behalf of Melbourne buyers.
xxii It is pertinent that most of the inter-colonial 
firms that did participate were major wool exporters.
xxiii Their involvement in copper 
and copper ores can be surmised as being associated with: (i) an interest to purchase on 
their own account from motives of profit; (ii) their activities as commission agents for 
interested buyers abroad, as was also the case with some of their wool purchases; (iii) 
their desire to use the products as ballast to accompany their wool exports so as to 
reduce overall freight costs. 
  Selling directly to smelters was another alternative means of obtaining liquid 
funds, except that no South Australian smelter was capable of handling large quantities 
of ores until 1849 when the Patent Copper Company (from 1853 taken over by the 
English and Australian Copper Company) started production at Kooringa, close to the 
Burra  Burra  mines.  However,  this  smelting  arrangement  precluded  any  financial 
transactions, for in their agreement with the Kooringa smelters, the miners obtained 
copper in return for their ores, while in turn, the smelters retained a proportion of the 
ores as payment for their smelting services.
xxiv This arrangement through payment-in-
kind did nothing to solve SAMA’s interest in obtaining monetary returns, as they were 
still left with the need to market the product.
xxv Thus home sales proved sporadic raising 




While the potential of the Burra Burra Mine as a rich producer was quickly realized, the 
initial establishment costs soon ate up the reserve of £2,320 and placed the directors in a 
dilemma: whether to continue expenditure on mining the ores, or whether to transport 
raised ores to Port Adelaide for shipping?
xxvi They had insufficient funds to do both
xxvii 
and as a stop-gap measure, and within a few weeks of the Mine’s opening at the end of 
September 1845, the only strategy open to the directors was to borrow money from 
holders of SAMA scrip.
xxviii Thus, for example, it was noted in January 1846 that the 
sum of £1,280.14s.10d had been borrowed for the purpose of paying wages and cartage. 
Among the lenders were C & F. Beck who had loaned £150, C.S. Penny £300, and S. 
Stocks Jnr who loaned £145. For this service they were repaid with interest of 9s 10d, 
26s.3d and 2s.5d respectively.
xxix In 1850 this practice was placed on a more formal 
basis when it was decreed that shareholders could deposit ‘not less that £500 nor in  
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aggregate more than £10,000, to be held at interest at 6% per annum to be paid or called 
by either party on one days notice being previously given’.
xxx In obtaining loans (not 
calls)
xxxi from shareholders it was the belief of the directors that the practice avoided 
breach  of  the  no-liability  clauses  of  the  Cost-book  system,  especially  as  they  could 
claim  that  they  held  collateral  in  the  form  of  ore  that  had  been  raised.  The  sums 
borrowed proved most helpful to the directors in meeting SAMA’s obligations and in 
October 1851, for example, the amount received in deposit amounted to £14,890.
xxxii 
  While the temporary loans were used as a means to allow the Association to 
function, the practice was later extended to suit the interests of shareholders who had 
spare cash to deposit and who were attracted by both the desire to help SAMA (and thus 
themselves) and to take advantage of interest rates that were set slightly above bank 
rates. Such services were later extended, with scrip holders being allowed to transfer 
sums  of  money,  usually  to  London,  via  the  Association  (Table  1,  column  2).  The 
shareholders paid SAMA in Adelaide and in turn the Association transferred the value 
on deposit via bills of exchange and at a lower rate than charged by local banks. This 
practice appealed to the shareholders for unlike the banks, SAMA paid interest from the 
day they purchased the bill to the day of final usance, and in some cases even offered 
payment of interest until redeemed from the agent. Thus J & T Waterhouse in 1850 
deposited £2,000 with SAMA in Adelaide, for which they received 10 per cent interest 
until the date the order was inscribed to be paid in London, with that arrangement being 
extended until the day the agent finalized the payment.
xxxiii The advantages to SAMA 
was  that  it  received  immediate  liquidity,  it  eliminated  the  problem  of  being  given 
limited drawing rights by the bank and it saved them the cost of having the remittance 
being  sent  back  to  Adelaide  by  the  agent,  if  indeed  that  course  of  settlement  was 
required.  To  illustrate  the  importance  of  such  transactions  with  shareholders,  it  is 
notable that between 1845 and 1870, SAMA negotiated over half-a-million pounds in 
this way, while its advances from the Bank of Australasia amounted to just over three-
quarters of a million pounds. 
  Yet another strategy to utilise the funds of shareholders was associated with 
payment of dividends, especially those earned by members domiciled overseas. Aided 
by a buoyant market for copper that coincided with the boom associated with railway 
construction in Britain, share values had increased from £5 to £225 by September 1848 
and dividends of 850 per cent had been paid to that date. With an increasing number of 
shareholders moving overseas, problems of paying some of these dividends arose. On  
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occasions when dividends were not picked up nor special arrangements made with an 
Adelaide agent of the shareholder to transmit them,
xxxiv the Association felt warranted in 
utilising the funds for its own purpose until they were finally redeemed.
xxxv Overseas 
shareholders  holding  10  shares  or  more  could  arrange  for  SAMA  to  transmit  their 
dividends via letters-of credit or drafts
xxxvi ‘…on their paying all expenses attending 
such  payment’.
xxxvii  With  the  magnitude  of  dividend  transmittances  and  the  delay 
between mailing the drafts and their redemption overseas, SAMA was in effect master 
of the dividend funds, which again proved an important source to help the Association 
overcome its liquidity problems.  
  There  were  also  negative  aspects  of  the  huge  dividend  payments  made  to 
shareholders,  for  in  line  with  ‘cost-book’  practice  it  was  expected  that  returns  to 
shareholders should take precedence above all else. Despite the richness of the ores the 
danger was that being so far from the Swansea market, this desire to serve the interests 
of its shareholders would rebound upon the interests of the Association as a whole if 
returns were delayed or if there was a drop in the value of copper. And, indeed, in 1848 
the directors found themselves financially exposed to a serious degree because of this 
reason and another related factor, this being associated with the actions of some, or 
possibly all of their tributors who had cheated their employers by falsifying the grades 
of ores they deposited with the Association.
xxxviii This resulted in the values drawn on 
the Bank of Australasia, based on the percentage of copper in the ores before shipment, 
being excessive because ores estimated at 35 per cent to 40 per cent were in reality as 
low  as  19  per  cent.
xxxix  This  deception  left  the  Association  and  its  overseas  agents 
seriously exposed when expected returns failed to reach the anticipated sums and when 
on some shipments it led to deficiencies.
xl  
 
Wages and stores 
Utilising the resources of shareholders was not the only means of obtaining ready funds, 
and though not peculiar to SAMA alone, wage payment methods and charges made for 
mining  stores  allowed  the  Association  credit,  or  helped  reduce  costs.  This  can  be 
interpreted as benefits to the Association being accrued on the backs of their workers. 
Taking  precedent  from  traditional  Cornish  practice  the  ‘long  pay’  was  one  wage 
payment  method  adopted.
xli  This  practice  saw  the  payment  of  bare  subsistence  to 
workers for a period of time before final settlement was made. Even daymen working 
on  an  hourly  basis  received  ‘subsist’  for  a  period  of  a  month.
xlii  Tributers  at  first  
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received settlement when sampling assays were agreed but this was soon changed to 
‘the seventh Saturday after the expiration of the Take.’
xliii At times this seven-week 
period was extended, it being explained that this would depend upon ability to get the 
ores to the port or the availability of shipping at Port Adelaide. For example, in June 
1846 it was determined that at the next letting the workers should be told they would 
receive ‘A moderate subsist and that the balance of their wages will not be paid until the 
season enables the Association to get the ore away’.
xliv The result was that in effect the 
miners provided credit to the mine owners.
  At least it can be said that the situation was 
superior  to  that  experienced  at  the  Kapunda  and  Montacute  copper  mines,  where, 
claimed SAMA’s Secretary, Henry Ayers, it was practice to pay subsist for up to a 
period of 18-months before settlement took place. Payment at these South Australian 
mines  was  made  only  after  their  returns  from  overseas  sales  were  received  in 
Adelaide.
xlv 
  The strategy not only provided credit to the owners but was also a means to 
ensure a captive workforce. This was evident during the goldrush of the early 1850s 
when workers were leaving South Australia for the Victorian diggings in their droves. 
On that occasion Ayers directed Henry Roach, the Mine’s chief Captain, to refrain from 
finalising payment ‘until one month after settlement of their ores as by this means we 
shall prevent many of them having money to receive from leaving for the Diggings’.
xlvi  
  Wage payments were problematic for the Association as they were probably 
for other employers in the colony and other parts of Australia. The major problem, one 
that was also shared with British employers, was the shortage of small denomination 
coins.
xlvii  This  and  distance  from  Adelaide  meant  that  payment  strategies  had  to  be 
adopted by SAMA to satisfy their workers. Thus, the Association produced its own 
notes, which it printed in denominations of 5-shillings, 10s, 15s and £1, and it also 
printed in larger denominations, especially when paying various ‘pares’ on settlement 
days
xlviii (See Figures 1A, 1B, 1C). Notes were paid either to ‘Order’ or to ‘Bearer’ the 
latter being particularly dominant claimed SAMA’s Secretary, Henry Ayers, ‘since in 
nine  cases  out  of  ten,  the  men  cannot  write’.
xlix  Such  notes  circulated  locally  and 
because of the Association’s high reputation they would even have been accepted in 
Adelaide. Practice being similar to other areas (and even in Britain) for much of the 19
th 
Century, local shopkeepers and traders would have accepted these notes in exchange for 
goods, with balances being paid to the workers in token coins or notes bearing the name 
of  the  trader  or  shopkeeper.
l  When  sufficient  SAMA  notes  were  collected  by  these  
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providers of goods and services they would have been exchanged for legal tender by 
SAMA, or by the Bank of Australasia. This procedure again provided credit to SAMA 
between time of issue of the notes and redemption. In addition, while not being a major 
source of advantage, there was the chance that such notes would go astray, and Henry 
Ayers was adamant that if miners lost their orders ‘they must bear the loss’.
li Only in 
February 1860, soon after the Bank of Australasia opened a branch at Kooringa, did 
SAMA abandon the practice of supplying its own notes for relatively small payments. 
From that time on, the mine accountant was instructed to deposit a cheque with the 
Bank and to obtain notes and silver to the amount to be paid out on ‘subsist day’.
lii  
 
Figure 1A: SAMA payment note for 16 shillings, 1 March 1848, made out to  
    John Rowe or Bearer 
 
 
Figure 1B: SAMA payment note for £10, 29 February 1848, made out to Sam 





  While the Association continued to provide its own notes for large payments, 
even this practice was abandoned at the beginning of 1869, when Ayers instructed that 
all wages should in future be paid in cash drawn from the Kooringa branch of the Bank  
 




liii Whether this was a reflection of a more certain supply of coins in the 
colony, or was because the mine was in rapid decline at this time, is unknown.  
 
Figure 1C: SAMA payment note for £3, 26 August 1854, made out to the ‘pare’ 
              at Pitch No. 1 and payable to Bearer. 
 
 
Source for Figs 1A, 1B, 1C: ‘Butts of Orders Issues for Wages and Certain Other Expenses’, BRG 
22, 1509, State Library of South Australia.  
 
  Much has been written about the incentive that the tribute system gave to those 
skilled Cornish miners who worked in anticipation of the rewards should they mine a 
‘bonanza’. However, the chance of that happening was slim and with rare exceptions 
tributers wages approximated those of day-wage labour, as the captains who set the 
upset prices for the auctioned pitches based their calculations on the grade of observable 
ore  and  price  of  copper  in  anticipation  of  the  miners  earning  ‘standard’  wages.  On 
occasions pares earned under this level, sometimes just above, and while they tried all 
kinds  of  strategies  to  deceive  the  mine  captains  they  seldom  did,  for  the  latter  had 
themselves been practical miners chosen for their expertise and they knew all the tricks 
that  miners  would  get  up  to  in  order  to  hide  the  true  value  of  a  pitch.  While  the 
occasional bonanza or ‘sturt’ no doubt helped maintain the tribute system by providing 
incentive  and  hope  to  the  various  ‘pares’,  SAMA’s  directors  became  stricken  with 
remorse when such occasions arose and did their utmost to drive the captains to set hard 
bargains. Not only that but when the rare bonanza did occur they chastised them. Henry 
Ayers  noted  in  1846  that  ‘Nothing  does  us  so  much  real  mischief  as  men  making 
extravagant wages…’.
liv When tutworkers averaged £3.15s per week during December 
1958,  Ayers  was  quick  to  point  out  that  this  ‘must  be  immediately  checked.  Our 
standard wage was 50/- per week when provisions were far more  costly  …  I think  
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therefore you might fairly reduce wages below that rate to 45/-‘.
lv On other occasions 
mine captains were asked to provide explanations when the ‘standard’ was exceeded.
lvi 
However, when wages  fell below the expected ‘standard’ the directors also showed 
concern, for such situations could lead to a discontented workforce and possible loss of 
workers.
lvii 
  Yet another way of reducing costs, and thus reducing liquidity problems, was 
associated with the sale of mining stores to the workers. This proved lucrative when the 
extent  of  the  supplies  is  taken  into  consideration.  Candles  were  a  major  item  of 
consumption. In 1864, when mining activity was already in decline, it was noted that a 
total of 1,920 pounds of candles were provided to the 200 to 250 miners on a monthly 
basis.
lviii With candles costing SAMA 2d per pound being sold to the miners at 12d a 
pound,
lix there were handsome annual returns, that would have amounted at that time to 
£645, a sum more than sufficient to have paid the annual salary of the Association’s 
Secretary, Ayers. A similar story could be told for supply of fuses that in 1864 cost 2s 
6d to 3s per coil but which were sold at 4s 6d,
lx and also for other goods and tools 
supplied to the miners including use of equipment such as the Association’s crusher that 
was used to process the miners’ ores.
lxi 
  When  problems  later  arose,  one  way  of  ensuring  that  profit  levels  were 
maintained  involved  careful  selection  of  ores.  For  example  in  1855  when  drought 
caused input costs to rise, the miners were directed to raise only ores that assayed above 
18 per cent. The directive did not mean that ores below this percentage could be dressed 
up to that level from lower grade ores but the instruction was as stated ‘to raise only 
high quality ores, leaving lower grade ores for less costly times.’
lxii This, however, was 
only a rare occurrence, as the directors generally frowned at picking out the eyes of the 
mine.
lxiii  
  Comment has been made on the ‘paternalistic’ nature of the employers,
lxiv a 
term that suggests magnanimity whereby welfare concerns and social obligations to the 
workers  and  families  were  part  and  parcel  of  the  concern  of  the  directors.  Indeed 
Blainey  went  as  far  as  to  say  that  ‘In  an  age  of  laissez  faire  Burra  was  the  most 
benevolent  company  in  the  land…’,
lxv  However,  this  is  largely  a  myth  as  close 
inspection  shows  profit  maximisation  over  social  expectations  was  the  maxim  of 
SAMA. One example was associated with the supply of necessary infrastructure in the 
early days when the directors instructed their resident director at the mine, not to put 
stone flagging on the cottage floors, ‘so as to limit cost as much as possible’.
lxvi Another  
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example is linked to SAMAs approach when supplying a small cottage as a hospital 
(though most workmen refused to use it)
lxvii for it refused to open up to family members 
until  1872
lxviii  when  it  was  about  to  hand  over  responsibility  to  the  local  town 
Corporation. Not only that but it even refused to supply firewood to the hospital for 
heating purposes unless paid for from the worker funded ‘Club & Doctor Fund’, despite 
holding vast quantities in store.
lxix 
  While prepared to administer the ‘Club & Doctor Fund’,
lxx SAMA showed no 
enthusiasm to contribute, relying upon its workers to finance the welfare provisions 
through  wage  deductions.  Furthermore  it  often  utilised  the  accumulated  funds 
temporarily for its own purposes. The Association’s lack of generosity was also shown 
by their mean approach to those killed or maimed at the Mines and to their families, to 
the extent that in the case of a miner blinded at the mine his small weekly allowance 
was subject to an annual review of his case for charity and at the end of 1865 it was 
reduced from 14 shillings to 7 shillings a week, though they announced they would pay 
10 shillings if he was not on government rations.
lxxi. Many tragedies were compensated 
with no help save payment of burial expenses
lxxii while some requests by distressed 
widows of former employees were met with a blank refusal of aid.
lxxiii There were rare 
occasions when magnanimous gestures were made, such as the time they agreed that 
‘Widow Johns’ could occupy ‘a room’ free of rent following her husband’s death in a 
fire at the mine,
lxxiv but this ‘generosity’ was probably linked to publicity and a plea for 
aid by the local media in an article headed ‘Thomas Prior, and Peter Johns a man with a 
wife and 5 young children suffocated’.
lxxv On another rare occasion they agreed to pay a 
young boy a small allowance out of the mine account after he had fractured an arm 
when working on the surface, because he had not worked long enough to qualify for 
payment  out  of  the  Club  &  Doctor  Fund.
lxxvi  Above  all  else,  consideration  for  the 
interests of shareholders was predominant and minimal welfare expenditure can perhaps 
be seen as another way of reducing expenditure so as to enable payment of dividends.  
  While costs were carefully vetted and cost-cutting methods adopted under the 
eagle eye of the Association’s Secretary, Ayers,
lxxvii such strategies overall played only 
a minor part in ensuring the success of the working of the mine, which as it developed 
saw the need for greater and greater access to cash and credit. As there were limits to 
local sales and opportunities, the focus moved increasingly to the marketing skills of the 
directors, who were  forced to court the banks  and to adopt strategies  guaranteed to 
maximise opportunities on foreign markets.  
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Banking and advances 
 
As previously noted, the Cost-book organisation of the Association, plus the reluctance 
of the established banks to extend credit on property posed a problem in the early days 
of mine production. Not only was there a prohibition upon lending on property but 
orthodox  banking  even  frowned  on  lending  on  collateral  furnished  in  the  form  of 
primary  products.  Butlin  points  out  that  even  after  passing  of  the  Liens-on-Wool 
legislation of 1846, banks remained aloof from the practice, preferring that arrangement 
to be conducted by merchants – though in turn, the banks through conventional means 
financed the merchants.
lxxviii However, as earlier explained, this back-door method of 
obtaining credit through the banks was not open to the Association, as merchants were 
tardy  in  purchasing  SAMA’s  ores.  Thus,  forced  to  resort  to  their  own  devices  the 
Association fell back to the age-old strategy of utilising the services of overseas agents 
and in persuading the banks to accept their ores, and later copper, as collateral. 
  It was with some reluctance that the Bank of Australasia extended funds for 
SAMA’s ores, and this only because the local officials were aware that SAMA had also 
approached John Stephens, Manager of the Bank of South Australia.
lxxix The directors’ 
first  success  lay  in  obtaining  £240  on  the  30  tons  of  ore  shipped  to  Swansea  per 
Margaret at the end of 1845.
lxxx This flat rate of £8 per ton was only a proportion of the 
value of the ores and did little to allay the Associations problems at that time. Living 
from hand to mouth, the Association’s directors must have felt relieved when a month 
later the bank agreed to extend the lien on ore shipped to ‘ore in stock’ at the wharf in 
Port Adelaide, receiving a payment amounting to £800 for 100 tons of copper ore.
lxxxi 
While helpful, this was still too little to satisfy SAMA’s insatiable appetite for funds, 
especially as road transportation and shipping were largely restricted to the summer 
months from October to April, a situation that saw accumulation of ores at ‘grass’ on 
the mine’s dressing area. This situation threatened the viability not only of the mine but 
also the economic health of the colony that had become economically more vibrant 
because of the large multiplier effect generated by the Association’s activity. The high 
quality  of  the  Burra  Burra  ores  and  growing  world  demand  for  copper  guaranteed 
collateral safety as far as the bank was concerned and this saw an extension of their 
largesse to providing payment for ores raised and ready for transportation at the mine.  
  This came about because fortunately, soon after the Burra Burra mines opened, 
Marshall MacDermott was transferred as manager of the defunct Western Australian,  
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Perth branch of the Bank of Australasia, to the Adelaide branch. Fortunate that is for 
SAMA, because MacDermott who had previously been criticised in Perth for his lax 
lending policies continued this practice at his new abode. For this ‘weakness’ he was 
eventually  castigated  and  dismissed  in  March  1852  by  order  of  the  Bank’s  London 
directors.
lxxxii MacDermott’s actions were greatly appreciated by SAMA and when he 
subsequently  applied  for  the  position  of Justice  of  the  Peace  at  Kooringa,  SAMA’s 
directors were happy to support him as he had ‘always looked after their interests with 
competence’. Thus it was under his regime that in 1847 Ayers was able to  
 
enclose two promissory notes for three thousand pounds (£3,000) each … to be 
held as collateral security against any drawn accounts of the Association during 
this term … there are now at the Burra Burra mines upwards of … (6000) tons 
of Copper Ore on the surface which is ready for shipment and as soon as the 
state of the roads will permit it will be forwarded to Port Adelaide with the 
understanding  that  on  its  arrival  there  it  is  to  remain  subject  to  the  Banks 




In addition, the bank extended its accommodation to the expected value of ores, and by 
February 1847 the 359 tons of 38 per cent ore on the Royal Archer, drew at ‘… the rate 
of ten pounds (£10) per ton of 21 cwts,’
lxxxiv while the cargo of the Harpooner, assayed 
at 48 per cent average, drew at £12 per ton.
lxxxv Such accommodation did not spell the 
end of concern by SAMA’s directors, for the gap between shipping the ores, completing 
sales  overseas  and  honouring  their  drafts  on  the  Bank  of  Australasia,  left  them 
periodically in a parlous position as far as the Bank was concerned. Thus in December 
1846 SAMA’s Board ‘… began to be very uneasy at the state of their affairs’, for at that 
time their balance owing to the Bank of Australasia was £11,772.9s.3d.
 lxxxvi Fortunately 
at this time, some 12 months after despatch of its first ores, SAMA’s returns began to 
flow in from abroad and financial worries eased considerably thereafter, so much so that 
the  directors  felt  confident  enough  to  announce  two  dividends  of  50  per  cent  to 
shareholders  and  to  extend  a  wage  rise  to  Ayers.
lxxxvii  This  also  coincided  with 
substantial  local  sales.  However,  the  Bank  supervisor,  J.J.  Falcon  and  the  Bank’s 
London directors while now kindly disposed to the business transacted were far from 
enamoured  with  a  situation  that  saw  them  basically  bankroll  dividend  payments  to 
SAMA’s shareholders. As Falconer stated: 
It appears singular to me that a company which has been so successful, and has 
already  paid  back  so  enormous  a  sum  beyond  its  capital  to  its  proprietors, 
should consider it expedient or even creditable to anticipate its receipts, by  
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borrowing money at 10 per cent for which to pay further Dividends – however 
so long as our advances are protected by so large a quantity of ore actually at 
the Port, and ready for shipment the account is safe and profitable one to us and 
we have no reason to desire any change in their mode of operation.
lxxxviii 
 
Five months later Falconer looked with ‘great anxiety’ when noting that in June 1848 
the balance owed by SAMA  
 
amounted  to  £55,697.12.7  a  sum  considerably  exceeding  one  half  of  your 
allotted capital, which cannot I fear be prudently withdrawn for your general 
business without damaging and injuring the connexion of the Bank.
lxxxix 
 
Not only that, but as he had earlier warned MacDermott, the situation had got out of 
hand and the Adelaide account with SAMA had proved an embarrassment to the  
 
 [London] Court by drawing upon them for funds which they do not possess, 
and cannot command, and if therefore it should become apparent to you that 
further  advances  will  be  required  you  must  at  once  decline  to  afford  such 
further aid, whatever the consequences may be.
xc 
 
The wisdom of Falconer’s words was borne out when in early 1849 it became clear that 
the returns on which advances had been made had been grossly overestimated. Not only 
had copper prices dropped substantially (34 per cent ores were claimed to have dropped 
by £6 per ton between July and September 1848)
xci but the position was exacerbated by 
the previously mentioned skulduggery of the tributers in falsifying their ore grades. This 
and attempts by the directors to set up a more onerous assaying system and an attempt 
to  cut  wages  led  to  a  14-week  strike  by  miners  and  teamsters  deriving  from  these 
incidents. Particularly malevolent to the interests of the Association was the stoppage by 
bullock dray carriers that prevented the carriage of ores to Port Adelaide.
xcii In addition 
to  adversely  affecting  production  and  cartage,  the  bullock  dray  embargo  left  the 
Association  facing  high  penalty  costs,  for  at  the  end  of  the  strike  there  were  16-
chartered vessels at the Port, all on demurrage.
 xciii The situation threatened to cripple 
SAMA and shook the directors’ feeling of invulnerability. Thereafter common cost-
book practice was abandoned and a more conservative approach taken to its dividend 
allocations when it was sensibly decided to set aside a sum of £123,200 to its Capital 
Account as a reserve against ‘rainy days’.
xciv 
  In 1849, the problems of assaying were largely resolved with appointment of a 
new  assayer  and  a  new  agreement  whereby  the  Patent  Copper  Company  converted 
Burra ores into copper at its Kooringa works adjacent to the mine. This saw SAMA  
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draw from the Bank at a flat rate of £65 per ton on its first shipment of 55 tons of 
‘Tough Cake Copper’ shipped aboard the Duke of Wellington in early 1850,
xcv and at 
£70 on a shipment of 200 tons per Providence to Calcutta, their first foray into that 
market.
xcvi  
  Relations with the  Bank of Australasia proved  harmonious from 1850. The 
exodus  from  South  Australia  during  the  goldrush  caused  only  few  headaches  for 
SAMA, for mining on a reduced scale continued. Manning at the mine fell from 1,013 
miners in September 1851 to just 100 a year later, while production fell from 10,372 
tons to 2,363 tons of ore in the same period. As production fell at half the rate of the 
manning of the mine, and as there were large reserves at grass when the exodus took 
place, SAMA took advantage of rapidly rising copper prices at that time
xcvii to increase 
its profits and to move out of the red with the Bank of Australasia.
xcviii The explanation 
for this is simple: when production was high so were the variable costs for wages, 
transport, fuel, etc., so that there was a high demand for liquidity in order to fund the 
expenses;  when  production  was  low,  costs  greatly  declined  and  so  did  the  need  to 
borrow. With high copper prices, large stocks at grass augmented by working only ore 
deposits at the higher levels of the mine to send to the market, plus greatly reduced 
overheads the effect of reducing the Association’s debts proved beneficial. 
 
Agents and overseas marketing 
 
While the Bank of Australasia, local sales, and sales to merchants were the lifeblood 
when meeting SAMA’s demands for funds, the vital link when marketing on its own 
account (see table 2) and also in seeing that its accounts with the Bank were serviced, 
was the commission agent. Such agents provided the conduit by which bills of exchange 
were  channelled  and  were  also  instrumental  in marketing  the  Association’s  produce 
overseas. 
  SAMA’s agents were  chosen with care and strategies had to be adopted to 
ensure that they served the interests of the Association. In the first place, the directors 
called upon their brother directors and shareholders to recommend competent agency 
houses abroad. To ensure full compliance the persons who recommended a house were 
made responsible for any shortcomings that could eventuate. While there was no place 
in  law  to  commit  a  person  to  honour  any  shortcomings  by  the  agency  they  had 
recommended,  in  a  small  business  community  such  as  Adelaide,  where  the  honour  
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system and ‘gentleman’s agreement’ was considered sacrosanct, there was little risk that 
any indiscretions would be ignored. All agents were apprised of the situation involving 
those who recommended their services, such as the note to Messrs E.J. Wheeler & Co., 
London, when informed that ‘Mr. Bunce personally guaranteed that in the event of your 
dishonouring the Drafts he would hold the Directors harmless.’
xcix Such a responsibility 
upon  the  recommending  person  was  softened  by  the  fact  that  agents  paid  them  a 
commission on all sales or services performed for SAMA. However, from early 1853 
when virtually the whole of SAMA’s lucrative British copper exports were directed 
through  the  house  of  Messrs.  James  Morrison &  Co.,  the  board  took a  harder  line, 
insisting that they were very much against the custom of dividing the commissions with 
individual directors ‘who were supposed to have influence cargoes to them’, on the 
principle that no ‘individual member … has sufficient influence to direct a consignment 
to any particular House’. Ayers further stressed that ‘… it is the act of the Board and 
they feel that if any reduction in the charges can be made … the Company alone should 
receive the full benefit of the sale’.
 c They obtained their requested reduction in charges 
and cutting out the middleman proved of direct benefit to the Association’s fortunes. 
  Agents were expected to perform a number of services. When SAMA exported 
copper  ore  they  had  to  ensure  that  they  avoided  the  machinations  of  the  Swansea 
smelting cartel in trying to suppress prices. They were responsible for meeting drafts 
drawn on the Bank of Australasia and for purchasing any machinery and goods required 
for the Burra Burra Mine. They also settled freight, insurance and other charges on 
behalf of the Association and were responsible for settling accounts, and returning any 
surpluses from sales in the form of drafts, or specie. If need be they were expected to 
dip into their own reserves until they received reimbursement from sales of SAMA’s 
produce, being compensated if they did so.  
  While, as already explained, agents were chosen after recommendation, in the 
case of Messrs Jones & Younghusband of Liverpool, it was the fact that they were able 
to provide cheap freight from Port Adelaide on one of their ships that induced SAMA to 
utilise their services.
ci Agents were also expected to furnish market news that could help 
the Association – and with a number of agencies doing so, then cross-checking the 
information constituted a means of weighing up their worth and integrity. This also 
applied in India, where, Messrs. D.C. Mackey was asked to supply  
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periodical advices … on the state of the copper market, price currents etc., 
together with any suggestions you may think proper to offer on the kind and 
size of copper best adopted for shipment to your Port.
cii  
 
Checks were also made by directors who happened to venture abroad, although this was 
not without its weaknesses, as illustrated by the favours offered the house of Richard 
Hallett & Sons of London when SAMA’s largest shareholder, John Benjamin Graham, 
became rather too friendly with the owner to the detriment of the Association.
ciii 
  Over  time,  a  process  of  elimination  occurred  as  flaws  appeared,  leading  to 
utilisation of only two or three agencies. In India two major houses emerged, Messrs. 
Forbes & Co. of Bombay
civ and D. C. Mackey of Calcutta, the former being eventually 
dropped when realised that prices brought for copper in Bombay were lower than in 
Calcutta and because it was found the agent’s charges were excessive.
cv When Mackey 
agreed to reduce their charges because of their virtual monopoly granted by SAMA, this 
sealed their positive standing in the eyes of the directors.
cvi The only flaw revealed by 
the directors, which threatened ‘an additional charge on sales’, was the puzzling fact 
that their Adelaide weights did not tally with the scales in Calcutta. This induced the 
directors to deduce that ‘placing an [sic] European on board the next ship will fully 
explain  the  matter.  It  seems  to  be  a  loss  peculiar  to  Eastern  Ports’.
cvii  No  further 
complaints on this account were made and Mackey continued as SAMA’s Indian agent, 
while in Britain the copper consignments became restricted to Messrs. James Morrison 
& Co., London, and Henry Edwards of Birmingham who received a small proportion of 
SAMA’s exports. 
  Overall it can be said that SAMA was well served by its overseas agents. They 
provided a number of vital services in a situation where correspondents were many 
months away and where initiative and judgement had often to be taken on the spot. 
SAMA  was  also  able  to  keep  them  under  control  through  a  system  of  checks  and 
balances, although financial reward by being granted increasing shipments when they 




Distance from market, the workings of the Navigation Acts that prevented foreign ships 
from conveying cargo in the early years of activity at the Burra Burra Mines, early 
restrictions  on  using  minerals  as  collateral,  plus  the  peculiar  situation  regarding  the 
Cost-book system that forbade acceptance of credit, were eventually overcome. While  
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local merchants were at first reluctant to handle SAMA’s produce, accommodation after 
some delay was increasingly granted by the banking system. The Bank of Australasia 
progressed from its early reluctance to accommodate the miners to seeing the benefits of 
lending on collateral and the more the Association was able to draw from that source 
and also from its agents then the less vulnerable was its situation. What is pertinent is 
that  SAMA  itself  performed  bank-like  activities  when  it  produced  its  own  notes  to 
service its own wage and other expenses in the colony, and when the interests of its 
shareholders were served through servicing their drafts abroad. Indeed, that service at 
times even outweighed the services provided by the bank when satisfying its liquidity 
requirements. Additionally, contingency funds were obtained through borrowing from 
shareholders. Through various other strategies such as the long-pay and by exploiting 
the miners through marking up the price of mining stores, and even by periodically 
utilising worker generated welfare funds, the directors were able to reduce costs and 
overcome liquidity problems that were evident. The paper illustrates that despite its title 
as the richest copper mine in the world in the 1840s and 1850s, there were still problems 
associated with distance from market that had to be overcome by the mine’s board of 
directors. 
  The paper in addressing the problems faced by an extremely successful mining 
company in the period under discussion also highlights problems that must have been 
faced  by  less  endowed  mining  ventures.  The  reality  was  that  having  wealth  stored 
underground was only part of the equation for a successful mining venture and that in 
colonial  Australia  many  problems  had  to  be  resolved  to  ensure  financial  success. 
Distance from markets, small financial resources, legal restrictions on borrowing on 
land, lack of bargaining power with shipping and also commission agents as well as the 
inability to face temporary financial crises must have been a barrier to the success of 
many ventures. This may help explain why so many promising mining prospects were 
forced  to  close  their  activities  in  the  nineteenth  century,  being  unable  to  avail 
themselves of the resources or strategies adopted by the directors of SAMA at their 
‘Monster’ Burra Burra Mines.  
 
                                                 
*  This  article  is  based  on  papers  presented  to  the  13
th  Australian  Mining  History  Association’s 
Conference  (in  conjunction  with  the  AHA)  at  Armidale,  NSW,  September  2007,  and  at  the  7th 
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